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NON-FINAL-VERSION
HYBRID VIEWS IN META-ETHICS (II): PRAGMATIC VIEWS 
§0. INTRODUCTION 
A common starting point for ‘going hybrid’ is the thought that moral discourse somehow combines 
belief  and desire-like aspects, or is both descriptive and expressive. Hybrid meta-ethical theories aim 
to give an account of  moral discourse that is sufﬁciently sensitive to both its cognitive and its 
affective, or descriptive and expressive, dimensions. They hold at least one of: 
!
(i) moral thought: moral judgements have belief  and desire-like aspects or elements. 
	 (ii) moral language: moral utterances both ascribe properties and express desire-like 	
	 attitudes.   1
!
This entry concerns hybrid theories of  moral language, namely theories subscribing to (ii). A major 
motivation for holding (ii) is its ability to capture an uncontroversial, theory-neutral, observation 
about moral discourse: 
!
	 Information about Desire-like Attitudes: Moral utterances standardly convey information about the 
	 speaker’s desire-like attitudes. For example, a person’s saying ‘Φ-ing is morally wrong /	
	 impermissible/immoral’ is good, even if  defeasible, evidence that they have some desire-like 
	 attitude against Φ-ing.   2
!
Theories that hold (ii) can explain how such information is conveyed by moral utterances whilst 
avoiding the problems afﬂicting Subjectivist views (which take moral utterances to report the 
speaker’s desire-like attitudes) and without having to deny that moral utterances ascribe properties at 
all, in the manner of  pure Expressivist views (which take moral utterances to simply express the 
speaker’s desire-like attitudes).  
	 The main division within hybrid theories of  moral language is between those treating the 
expression of  desire-like attitudes (hereafter ‘attitudes’) as semantic and those treating it as 
pragmatic.   This entry exclusively focuses on pragmatic forms of  (ii) and examines the prospects for 3
! #                                                                                                                                                                           1
#  ‘Ascribe’ is not meant as a success term here, given the possibility of  an error-theoretic hybrid theory. 1
#  I generally use ‘convey’ rather than ‘express’ to avoid confusion.2
#  Drawing the semantic / pragmatic distinction is fraught with difﬁculties and it would be unwise for me to 3
offer a suggestion here. Any attempt to draw the distinction here needs to be sensitive to the fact that: (i) some 
kinds of  presupposition are truth-conditionally relevant (ii) some kinds of  implicatures are conventional aspects 
of  terms and (iii) some implicatures clearly arise before semantic processing is complete. Hopefully the 
examples given herein are sufﬁcient to make it uncontroversial that there is some intuitive distinction here, 
however difﬁcult it is to draw. For further discussion see Boisvert (forthcoming) and Bach (2013).
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treating moral attitude expression as working via certain standard pragmatic mechanisms.   I explain 4
these mechanisms, outlining the properties that standardly deﬁne them, before testing to see 
whether moral attitude expression matches them. Most space is given to presupposition views and to 
implicature views (pragmatic hybrid theorists have mainly treated attitude expression as implicature).   5
At the end I brieﬂy explain a more minimal pragmatic alternative.   The main conclusions are that 6
we should disregard presupposition and conventional implicature views and that the most plausible 
options for a pragmatic hybrid view are a generalised conversational implicature view and a more 
minimal pragmatic view.  
	 It will be helpful to note here that whilst one can combine a pragmatic hybrid view of  moral 
language with a hybrid account of  moral thought - thesis (i) above - pragmatic hybrid views have 
mainly been combined with non-hybrid, and purely cognitivist, theories of  moral judgements. This 
is plausibly because existing pragmatic hybrids have been formulated to show how cognitivists can 
explain how moral utterances express attitudes without such attitudes being part of  moral 
judgements themselves. As it happens, all the pragmatic hybrid views discussed herein have been 
combined with non-hybrid, and cognitivist, views of  moral thought. 
	 A taxonomy which outlines this article is thus: 
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
! #                                                                                                                                                                           2
Semantic
Implicature
Conventional §2 Conversational §3Presupposition §1
Pragmatic
Simple Story §4
Hybrid theories of  
moral language
#  Boisvert (forthcoming) deals with the semantic forms of  (ii).4
#  Bar-On & Chrisman (2009) is an exception, given that their view is arguably a pragmatic, non-implicature, 5
hybrid.
#  Some pragmatic mechanisms such as, ‘conventions of  usage’ accounts, I leave out.6
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One word of  warning: each of  presupposition and implicature has a rich research program that I 
lack space to adequately address.   Thus let me point out before ignoring that: the existence of  7
conventional implicature is controversial,   particular instances of  each mechanism are disputed, and 8
the boundary between conventional implicature and presupposition is vexed.  	  9
	 Before I begin, let me deal with some preliminaries: 
!
	 1. Variation between views 
Pragmatic hybrid views give different answers to these questions with respect to some token moral 
utterance: 
!
	 Q1. What property is ascribed (A natural property? An irreducible moral property?) 
	 Q2. What attitude is expressed (Desire? Acceptance of  a norm or standard? Plan?)  
	 Q3. What is its object (Φ-ing? Agents who Φ? The property ascribed? Its instances?) 
!
Here is a brief  outline of  Barker, Copp, Finlay, and Strandberg’s views, using the example 
utterances they give, from which we see answers to some of  these questions:   10
	  
Barker 
Speaker: ‘X is good’  
literal content: X has natural property F.   11
implicature: Speaker is committed to approval of  F things. 
!
Copp 
Speaker: ‘X is wrong’ 
literal content: X is prohibited by the ideal moral code of  the relevant society.   12
! #                                                                                                                                                                           3
#  For excellent introductory overviews see Potts (forthcoming, 2007), Dekker (2012), Beaver & Geurts (2011), 7
Davis (2010).
#  See (e.g.) Bach (1999).8
#  See (e.g.) Karttunen & Peters (1979).9
#  Barker (2000), Copp (2001), Finlay (2004), Strandberg (2011).10
#  Barker (2000: 272) ‘There is no constraint upon what F is beyond its ﬁtting into someone’s moral 11
perspective and its being a natural property’. Note that this leaves open whether F can be a moral property.
#  In Copp’s theory this is treated as a natural property, though there will be non-naturalist counterparts. 12
Note that Copp thinks that this property just is the property of  being wrong so one could individuate less 
ﬁnely and treat his and Strandberg’s view as endorsing the same view of  literal content in ‘wrong’ utterances.
NON-FINAL-VERSION
implicature: Speaker subscribes to the relevant moral standard. 
!
Finlay 
Speaker: ‘X is good’ 
literal content: X satisﬁes some (type of) interest N. 
implicature: Speaker has (type of) interest N. 
!
Strandberg 
Speaker: ‘X is wrong’ 
literal content: X has the property of  wrongness. 
implicature: Speaker has ‘a certain action-guiding attitude’ in relation to X.    13
!
The varying answers to questions Q1-3 are important but herein these variations - particularly with 
Q2&3 - are problematic. Theorising about pragmatic mechanisms involves assessing the felicity of  
sentences - whether they are meaningless, contradictory, or a misuse of  words - and looking at what 
is conveyed by them. It is unwieldy to do this for each separate proposal for the desire-like attitude 
pragmatically conveyed by moral utterances. However, a placeholder (‘relevant desire-like attitude’), 
will be hopelessly artiﬁcial and likely yield indeterminate answers. As such I will treat the relevant 
desire-like attitude as that of  caring about morality where this comprises desiring that people act 
morally and being disposed to blame /resentment towards those who fail to act morally. I take this 
to be plausible enough. The person who says ‘Φ-ing is morally wrong / impermissible / immoral’ 
gives us good evidence that they care about morality.   14
!
	 2. types of  claim, types of  term 
I have referred to ‘moral utterances’ and ‘moral terms’. But there is a distinction between thin terms 
(‘wrong’, ‘ought’, ‘good’) and thick terms (‘chaste’, ‘cruel’, ‘kind’). It is unclear whether pragmatic 
hybridists’ working hypothesis is, or should be, that each kind deploys the same pragmatic 
mechanism.   For that reason, I conﬁne my discussion to utterances involving thin terms, leaving 15
! #                                                                                                                                                                           4
#  Strandberg normally glosses this attitude as that of  wanting that the action type not be performed.13
#  To repeat, I use this particular attitude only for methodological reasons. One should substitute whatever 14
one deems to be the most plausible candidate desire-like attitude. 
#  One reason to worry about this: it seems easier to ﬁnd synonyms for thick terms than for thin terms, which 15
might reﬂect differences in the kind of  pragmatic mechanism utilised. Thin terms and thick terms thus look 
potentially different with respect to detachability (explained below). For discussion see Roberts (forthcoming) 
and Väyrynen (forthcoming: ch 5).
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open whether thick terms merit different treatment. (However the discussion implicitly illustrates the 
range of  pragmatic mechanisms that thick terms might deploy.) 
	 Finally, it is useful to have a list of  moral discourse sentences to refer back to: 
!
	 D1. ‘Tax avoidance is wrong.’ 
	 D2. ‘Tax avoidance isn’t wrong.’ 
	 D3. ‘If  tax avoidance is wrong then Francesco will be angry.’ 
	 D4. ‘Tax avoidance might be wrong.’ 
	 D5. ‘Is tax avoidance wrong?’ 
!
We should suppose that each of  D1-5 is uttered within a ‘normal’ conversational context, by which I 
mean (at least) contexts in which it has not been made clear that a participant is an error theorist or an 
amoralist. 
!
§1. HYBRID VIEWS: PRESUPPOSITION 
I start with presupposition. When a speaker makes some utterance they often transparently rely 
upon some proposition, such that the utterance would not make sense were this presupposed 
proposition not true. They do not state the required proposition, rather, they rely upon it in making 
their utterance. For example: 
!
	 P1. ‘The British president wears a wig.’ 
	 Presupposition: There is exactly one British president.  
!
In making assertion P1, the speaker does not assert that there is exactly one British president. Rather, 
they assume this or take it for granted in making their assertion, by using ‘the’. 
	 A major issue within presupposition theory is whether presuppositions are pragmatic or 
semantic phenomena or if  both kinds occur.   Semantic presupposition theorists claim that 16
presupposition is a relation between sentences holding in virtue of  the sentence containing some 
! #                                                                                                                                                                           5
#  The ‘semantic’ in semantic presupposition - used interchangeably with ‘lexical’ and ‘conventional’ - marks 16
the fact that the presuppositions are part of  the conventional meaning of  speciﬁc words or constructions 
(‘presupposition triggers’). This is reason to think that moral attitude expression is more likely to be a form of  
semantic presupposition, given a speciﬁc set of  moral terms and constructions reliably express desire-like 
attitudes. However, a traditional understanding of  semantic presupposition gives bad results. This traditional 
view is that a presupposition must be true for the asserted content to have a truth value (e.g. P presupposes Q 
if  and only if  whenever P is true or false, Q is true.) Whilst there is some plausibility in thinking P1 lacks a 
truth value, given its failed presupposition, it is implausible that D1 lacks a truth value merely if  the speaker 
does not care about morality.
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speciﬁc word or construction that carries the presupposition by convention.   By contrast, Pragmatic 17
presupposition theorists treat presupposition as acts of  presupposing performed by speakers. 
Stalnaker provides this account of  pragmatic presupposition: 
!
	 A proposition P is a pragmatic presupposition of  a speaker in a given context just in case the 
	 speaker assumes or believes that P, assumes or believes that his addressee assumes or believes 
	 that P, and assumes or believes that his addressee recognizes that he is making these 	
	 assumptions, or has these beliefs.    18
!
Rather than wade into the debate between proponents of  semantic and pragmatic treatments of  
presupposition dispute, I restrict myself  to features of  presuppositions common to both views.    19
	 A major test for presuppositions is that presuppositions project. This means that the 
presuppositions generated in simple atomic sentences remain present even in contexts where regular 
semantic entailments are cancelled, contexts such as negation, conditionals, modals, and questions. 
Take these sentences: 
!
	 P2. ‘The British president doesn’t wear a wig.’ 
	 P3. ‘If  the British president wears a wig, it’s a convincing one.’ 
	 P4. ‘The British president might wear a wig.’ 
	 P5. ‘Does the British president wear a wig?’ 
!
Each of  P2-5 carries the same presupposition as P1 (that there is exactly one British president). Thus 
the presupposition in P1 projects. Taking the equivalent set of  moral sentences: 
!
	 D2. ‘Tax avoidance isn’t wrong.’ 
	 D3. ‘If  tax avoidance is wrong then Francesco will be angry.’ 
	 D4. ‘Tax avoidance might be wrong.’ 
	 D5. ‘Is tax avoidance wrong?’ 
!
it is fairly plausible that each of  D2-5 conveys that the speaker cares about morality. This is reason 
to think that moral attitude expression also projects. 
! #                                                                                                                                                                           6
#  Thus semantic presupposition theorists would reject my initial characterisation of  presupposition at the 17
beginning of  the section, which was framed in terms of  a speaker’s act of  presupposing.
#  Stalnaker (1991: 473).18
#  See, for example, Strawson (1950), Stalnaker (1991).19
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	 Here however is a disanalogy between presupposition and moral attitude expression. With 
presuppositions the speaker, or their assertion, takes something for granted. One consequence is that 
presuppositions are difﬁcult to reject with straightforward negation as this is typically interpreted as 
rejecting only the main claim. For example, rejecting P1 by saying ‘that’s false’, ‘I don’t think so’, or 
‘that’s not true’ allows the presupposition that there is exactly one British president to slip through, 
attacking only the claim that s/he wears a wig. 
	 By contrast, when moral utterances convey desire-like attitudes this does not seem to be a 
case of  presuming or presupposing the presence of  these attitudes. Take D1: 
!
	 D1. ‘Tax avoidance is wrong.’ 
	 Presupposition: Some behaviours are wrong 
	 Attitude-Expression: The speaker cares about morality 
	  
The speaker of  D1 presupposes that some behaviours are wrong. Someone who believes that no 
actions are wrong, or could be wrong, will not straightforwardly accept or reject D1.   They will 20
reject D1 in another way such as: 
!
	 R: ‘Hey, wait a minute. Nothing is wrong!’  
	  
By contrast, someone who merely believes that the speaker does not care about morality can 
straightforwardly accept or reject D1. They might think that it is strange for the speaker to utter D1 
and they might comment on it (‘That’s true, though I’m not sure why you’re talking about morality.’) 
but they are not placed in the awkward position of  someone who rejects a presupposition.   21
	 A further disanalogy between attitude expression and presupposition comes from the 
cancellation properties of  presuppositions. If  the presupposition is embedded, would-be 
presuppositions are cancellable, they can be contradicted without the speaker contradicting 
themselves or misusing words. By contrast, cancellation of  a presupposition is infelicitous in 
unembedded contexts. Notice the difference between: 
	  
! #                                                                                                                                                                           7
#  Someone may be happy to straightforwardly negate D1 in certain contexts, namely those in which it is 20
already established that they reject the presupposition. Similarly, one’s willingness to straightforwardly reject 
‘Jill is a witch’ will vary between contexts, depending on whether the existence of  witches is being taken 
seriously.
#  Complicating possibility: what if  the presupposition is that everyone (or everyone involved in the 21
conversation) cares about morality? This seems more plausible for thick terms than for thin terms though.
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	 P6. ‘John thinks that the British President wears a wig, which is weird given that Britain 	
doesn’t have a president!’ 
!
	 P7. #‘The British President wears a wig. There is [no/more than one] British President.’ 
!
P6 is ok whereas the speaker of  P7 contradicts themselves. Notice the contrast between the infelicity 
of  P7 and the felicity of: 
!
 	 D1*. ‘Tax avoidance is wrong. I don’t care about morality.’ 
!
One will be puzzled by the speaker’s choosing to utter D1*. But D1* is not contradictory or a misuse 
of  words in the way that P7 is. 
	 To summarise, moral attitude expression projects and so attitude expression ﬁts presupposition 
in this respect. However, there are signiﬁcant disanalogies. First, attitude expression, unlike 
presupposition, is cancellable in unembedded contexts. Second, the absence of  desire-like attitudes 
on the part of  the speaker of  D1 does not result in conversational awkwardness for the audience by 
precluding them from straightforwardly accepting or rejecting D1. This divergence between moral 
attitude expression and presupposition suggests that presupposition is not a promising pragmatic 
mechanism of  moral attitude expression for hybrid theorists. 
!
§2. HYBRID VIEWS: CONVENTIONAL IMPLICATURE 
David Copp and Stephen Barker each treat moral utterances as conveying desire-like attitudes via 
conventional implicature.   Conventional implicatures are elements of  the conventional meaning of  22
expressions which do not contribute to their truth-conditional content.   Two classic examples are 23
‘but’ and slurs such as ‘wop’:   24
! #                                                                                                                                                                           8
#  Caveat: as I explain in more detail below, Copp’s view actually diverges quite signiﬁcantly from an 22
orthodox conventional implicature view.
#  The category of  conventional implicatures is controversial, given that they are supposed to fall within 23
pragmatics and yet form part of  the conventional meaning of  expressions. And even those who allow for 
their existence might query the examples I will give -- ‘but’ and slurs. Space constraints preclude establishing 
that conventional implicature is well-motivated. However, I think this is moot. Even if  conventional 
implicature has good credentials generally I doubt that it is the correct model of  moral utterances. For 
discussion of  conventional implicature generally, see Bach (1999) and Potts (2007).
#  I use these examples of  conventional implicature tentatively, and in common with holders of  conventional 24
implicature views of  attitude expression (for discussion see e.g. Whiting (2013), Williamson (2003). I am not 
myself  wedded to a conventional implicature view of  slurs but they have enough in common with 
conventional implicature to be useful for explaining it. For discussion of  slurs see Hom (2010).
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!
	 A1:	 ‘Luisa is rich but honest.’ 
	 A1b:	 ‘Luisa is rich and honest.’ 
!
	 B1:	 ‘Luisa is a wop.’ 
	 B1b:	 ‘Luisa is Italian.’ 
!
There is clearly a difference in what is communicated by A1 over A1b, and B1 over B1b. 
Nonetheless, conventional implicatures do not affect the truth-conditional meaning of  their carriers; 
A1&A1b and B1&B1b plausibly have the same truth-conditions.  
	 There are two main pieces of  evidence that each pair has the same truth-conditional 
meaning, such that whatever is contributed by ‘but’ over ‘and’, and ‘wop’ over ‘Italian’ does not 
affect truth-conditions.  
	 First, as with presupposition, straightforward negation of  A1 (‘that’s false!’) is interpreted as 
targeting only the claim that Luisa is rich and honest, not the proposed contrast between wealth and 
honesty. Second, conventional implicatures project. Observe the way in which the derogatory attitude 
conveyed by B1 is equally conveyed by B2-5:  
!
	 B2. ‘Luisa isn’t a wop.’   25
	 B3. ‘If  Luisa is a wop then Francesco will be angry.’ 
	 B4. ‘Luisa might be a wop.’  
	 B5. ‘Is Luisa a wop?’  
!
(‘Italian’ does not project any analogous commitment of  the speaker across utterances which are 
analogues of  B2-B5.) The fact that conventional implicatures project -- they are present even when 
regular semantic entailments are cancelled -- is good evidence that they do not contribute to the 
truth-conditional meaning of  the expressions that generate them.  
	 Attitude expression by moral utterances matches conventional implicature with respect to 
projection as the desire-like attitudes expressed by D1 are also conveyed by D2-5. This is some 
evidence in favour of  a conventional implicature view given that projection is a (non-exclusive) 
feature of  conventional implicatures. 
	 Conventional implicatures are also standardly deﬁned as detachable and non-cancellable. An 
implicature is detachable when there is an alternative term or way of  saying truth-conditionally the 
! #                                                                                                                                                                           9
#  The derogatory attitude might not be conveyed if  the speaker puts scare quotes around the last word 25
(which would not be a straightforward negation).
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same thing without generating the implicature.   In fact, ‘detachability’ is an unhelpful term because 26
intuitively one only detaches something present, so the term obscures the difference between 
preventing an implicature from arising (‘detachability’) and withdrawing or canceling it. A better term 
for detachability would be ‘avoidability’. However because ‘detachability’ is standard in the 
literature I persist with it.  
	 The conventional implicatures generated by ‘but’ / ‘wop’ are detachable. One could use 
‘and’ / ‘Italian’ to say the same thing whilst avoiding the implicature. Moral attitude expression, 
however, does not match conventional implicature with respect to detachability as there is no 
expression equivalent to ‘morally wrong’ which does not standardly signal that the speaker cares 
about morality.   There is no alternative way of  saying the same thing as that tax avoidance is morally 27
wrong without conveying whatever attitudes are conveyed by D1.    28
	 Copp tries to tackle this worry.   His main reply is that absence of  an implicature-avoiding 29
alternative for ‘wrong’ is a contingent feature of  English and we can generate one by saying that 
some action ‘has the property that would be ascribed by saying that it is “morally wrong”’.    30
	 Can this metalinguistic device help to show that moral attitude expression is actually 
cancellable? How would an ordinary speaker understand the sentence: 
!
	 D8. ‘Tax avoidance has the property that would be ascribed by saying that it is ‘morally 	
	 wrong’.’ 
!
I think this will be interpreted as a way of  saying either (i) that tax avoidance is believed to be morally 
wrong or as an odd way of  saying (ii) that tax avoidance is morally wrong. If  (i) then D8 is not a way 
of  saying the same thing. If  (ii) D8 would convey whatever attitudes are conveyed by D1, and so 
would not detach the implicature. 
	 One might doubt that D8 is correctly rendered as either (i) or (ii). Rather than pursue this let 
me simply report the dialectical situation. To defend a conventional implicature hybrid one needs to 
show that moral attitude expression can be detached (and perhaps also explain why moral terms 
! #                                                                                                                                                                         10
#  Of  course the issue of  when two sentences say the same thing is vexed indeed. Further, Grice’s wording is 26
sometimes ‘the same thing’ and other times ‘the same thing (or approximately the same thing)’ Grice 
(1989:39, 43).
#  Remember, I left aside utterances using thick moral terms, for which detachability seems more plausible. 27
#  Copp (2009: 188) puts it thus: ‘there is no familiar predicate that stands to “wrong” as “Italian” stands to 28
“wop”’ See also Hay (2013).
#  Copp (2001: 35-6; 2009: 194); Finlay (2005: 13-14).29
#  Do any languages have a term which stands to “morally wrong” as ‘‘Italian” stands to “wop”?30
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have the odd feature of  being conventional implicatures without a clear alternative or show that 
there is in fact a clear implicature-detaching alternative).     31
	 A second strike against the Conventional Implicature model is the cancellability behaviour of  
Conventional Implicatures compared with attitude expression. An implicature is cancellable when 
either (i) the speaker can make explicit that they do not have the commitment otherwise indicated by 
their utterance without making their utterance infelicitous (a (non-semantic) misuse of  words for 
example) or (ii) there is a context in which a felicitous utterance would not give rise to the 
commitment. In contrast with presuppositions, which can be cancelled in embedded contexts, 
Conventional Implicatures are non-cancellable in both embedded and unembedded uses. Witness 
the infelicity of:  
!
	 B1*:	 #‘Luisa is a wop. Not that I have anything against Italian people.’ 
	 B4*. 	 #‘Luisa might be a wop. Not that I have anything against Italian people.’  
!
One cannot felicitously follow any of  B2-B5 with ‘Not that I have anything against Italian people.’    32
Conventional Implicatures cannot be felicitously cancelled in embedded or non-embedded contexts. 
	 What of  the cancellability of  moral attitude expression? Copp claims that it is: 
‘inappropriate to use the term [‘morally wrong’] in making a moral judgement unless one 
disapproves of  actions that have the property of  being wrong.  ’ He thinks that one cannot cancel 33
moral attitude expression because one’s utterance would be infelicitous in virtue of  a misuse of  the 
term ‘[morally] wrong’. Call this claim ‘non-cancellable’. Non-cancellable is an explicit denial that 
cancellation of  type (i) is possible.  
	 If  attitude expression works by conventional implicature we should ﬁnd an approximately 
equal level of  infelicity between B1*-B5* and D1*-D5*:  
!
	 B1*. #‘Luisa’s a wop. Not that I have anything against Italian people.’ 
	 B2*. #‘Luisa isn’t a wop. Not that I have anything against Italian people.’ 
! #                                                                                                                                                                         11
#  An alternative tack would be to accept that moral terms do not satisfy detachability but that this is an 31
exceptional kind of  conventional implicature. But this is ad hoc, absent some explanation of  why these 
conventional implicatures lack this feature.
#  As Williamson (2003:263) puts it: ‘someone who says “Lessing was Boche, although I do not mean to imply 32
that Germans are cruel” merely adds hypocrisy to xenophobia.’
#  Copp (2009:187). Copp formulates the relevant claim in terms of  what would be ‘semantically 33
inappropriate’. I omit this from the main text as the ‘semantic’ would be extremely distracting. As a 
conventional implicature theorist, Copp must mean by ‘semantic’ something other than that which is 
connected to the truth conditional meaning of  the term. 
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	 B3*. #‘If  Luisa is a wop then Francesco will be angry. Not that I have anything against 	
	 Italian 	people.’ 
	 B4*. #‘Luisa might be a wop. Not that I have anything against Italian people.’  
	 B5*. #‘Is Luisa a wop? Not that I have anything against Italian people.’  
!
	 D1*. ‘Tax avoidance is wrong. Not that I care about morality.’ 
	 D2*. ‘Tax avoidance isn’t wrong. Not that I care about morality.’ 
	 D3*. ‘If  tax avoidance is wrong then Francesco will be angry. Not that I care about 	
	 morality.’ 
	 D4*. ‘Tax avoidance might be wrong. Not that I care about morality.’ 
	 D5*. ‘Is tax avoidance wrong? Not that I care about morality.’ 
!
Looking at these two sets of  sentences, I think non-cancellable is too strong. Sentences D1*-5* do not 
seem inappropriate in the way that sentences B1*-5* do. D1*-5* are surprising but they are not 
infelicitous.  
	 The felicity of  D1*-5* is arguably a consequence of  the earlier observation that attitude 
expression is non-detachable. Given the availability of  an implicature-detaching alternative term, 
one would not use the implicature generating term in B1*-B5* if  one lacked the relevant attitude, 
which explains why B1*-5* are problematic.   If, as suggested above, moral utterances lack 34
implicature-detaching equivalents we should expect attitude expression to be cancellable, for there is 
no alternative analogous alternative to ‘wrong’. This possibly explains why why D1*-D5* are 
felicitous. 
	 Despite the propriety of  D1*-5* it is plausible that the following two claims are true. First, 
absent special contextual features, someone who does not care about morality and who utters D1-5 
has provided misleading, defeasible, evidence that they care about it. Second, cancellation in the 
manner of  D1*-5* is quite odd and surprising. Nevertheless, I do not think that these observations 
provide great support for a conventional implicature view. 
	 As highlighted by an exchange between Copp and Finlay,   a major issue for assessing the 35
cancellability of  attitude expression is the possibility of  amoralists, namely agents able to make moral 
judgements without caring about morality, and their making felicitous moral utterances. If  this is 
possible non-cancellable is false. There would be no reason to think that amoralists are incompetent 
with moral terms, even though it might be somewhat surprising that they make moral utterances. 
! #                                                                                                                                                                         12
#  Assumption: the alternative term is (known to be) clearly available to both participants.34
#  Copp (2009),  Finlay (2005).35
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	 Leaving aside whether amoralists are possible, there are two other plausible claims which 
would explain why non-cancellable might seem plausible as applied to moral attitude expression when 
it really is false. These explain the oddness of  D1*-5* without postulating misuse of  words. 
	 First, most people care about morality at least somewhat. Second, in general, someone’s 
engaging in utterances about what is required, permitted or prohibited by some standard makes it 
reasonable to infer that they care about (conformity to) that standard. These explain why utterances 
D1-5 from an amoralist will tend to be misleading even if  linguistically proper. If  someone did not 
care about morality we would want to know why they are making utterances about what is 
permitted or prohibited by morality. And this will be quite an unusual context, given that (avowed) 
amoralists are not frequently encountered.  
	 Some other examples will help here. Suppose, absent special conversational setup, someone 
makes one of  these utterances: 
!
	 - ‘Opening at 9am is illegal. Not that I care about the law.’ 
	 - ‘Eating beef  on friday violates Catholic doctrine. Not that I care about Catholic doctrine.’ 
	 - ‘Wearing white socks with black shoes is unfashionable. Not that I care about fashion.’ 
!
Without some special explanation, these utterances seem somewhat odd in the same way as D1*-5* 
seem odd. They do not seem equally odd as D1-5 which is presumably explained by the much 
greater frequency with which we encounter people indifferent to these standards, as compared with 
amoralists. 
	 To test the cancellability of  attitude expression, we should not look only at sentences like 
D1*-5* in abstraction. Doing so gives an inﬂated impression of  infelicity. In testing for cancellability, 
we should be sure to look at utterances in contexts which provide the best possible explanation of  
why someone who does not care about morality might nonetheless talk about what it permits or 
requires. Such contexts are those in which someone is an amoralist but who nonetheless has some 
reason to give moral verdicts (perhaps they are trying to prove their competence with moral terms). 
Focusing on these kinds of  cases undermines the sense that utterances like D1*-5* are improper. 
D1*-5* are unusual but, unlike the predictions of  the Conventional Implicature view, they are not 
infelicitous. 
	 I have pointed out weaknesses in the view that conventional implicature is a good model for 
pragmatic hybrids to appeal to. The main problems were, ﬁrst, the way in which attitude expression 
is non-detachable due to the unavailability of  alternative terms. Second, the fact that attitude 
expression is cancellable without impropriety (even if  this is unusual). There is, I concede, something 
odd in making moral utterances like D1-5 if  one does not care about morality. But the connection is 
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not as tight as if  a conventional implicature model were correct. If  we are searching for a pragmatic 
mechanism which: explains projection, accommodates the non-detachability of  attitude expression, 
and explains why attitude expression is cancellable, we should look elsewhere. 
	  
§3. HYBRID VIEWS: CONVERSATIONAL IMPLICATURE 
Conversational implicatures are propositions communicated by a speaker’s utterance act without 
being something they literally say. They are generated by the combination of  what the speaker says, 
the background context, and general conversational norms such as Grice’s: 
!
	 Cooperative principle: Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the     
	 stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of  the talk exchange in which 	   
you are engaged.   36
!
Snappy deﬁnitions of  conversational implicature are scarce creatures but Potts provides this helpful 
version, adapted from Hirschberg: 
!
	 Proposition q is a conversational implicature of  utterance U by agent A in context C if, and 
	 only if: 
	 i. A believes that it is mutual, public knowledge of  all the discourse participants in C that A is 
	 obeying the cooperative principle. 
	 ii. A believes that, to maintain (i) given U, the hearer will assume that A believes q. 
	 iii. A believes that it is mutual, public knowledge of  all the discourse participants that, to 	
	 preserve (i), one must assume that A believes q.   37
!
An example will help make this clearer.   Suppose that your car has clearly run out of  petrol and 38
you ask ‘Is there a garage around here?’ and I reply ‘There’s one around the corner’. My utterance 
conveys that the garage I refer to is a place to buy petrol (it is not a parking garage, it is open, it sells 
petrol etc). I do not state any of  these propositions but they are implicated by my utterance. This is 
because my saying that there is a garage around the corner is only consistent with my being a 
cooperative interlocutor if  it sells petrol, it is open etc for otherwise I would be violating the maxim 
of  quantity and relevance (at least).  
	 An important distinction within conversational implicature is between particular and generalised 
conversational implicatures. Particular conversational implicatures arise because of  speciﬁc features 
of  the context. In the example above, the utterance of  ‘there’s one around the corner’ only 
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#  Example from Grice (1989: 132).38
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generated the implicature that there was an open petrol station around the corner because of  
speciﬁc features of  the context. Generalised conversational implicatures, by contrast, are triggered 
by the use of  expression types and thus arise across contexts generally.   Two generalised 39
conversational implicatures (GCI) triggers are ‘or’ and number terms: 
!
	 GCI1. ‘The gold is in the bank vault or in the desert.’ 
	 Implicature: Speaker does not know in which location the gold is.   
	 [Trigger: ‘P or Q’] 
!
	 GCI2. ‘John has six children.’ 
	 Implicature: John has exactly six children.  
	 [Trigger: ‘six’] 
!
Moral attitude expression is connected to the use of  particular terms and does not arise due to 
idiosyncratic features of  a context.   Further, the most detailed implicature view - Caj Strandberg’s - 40
is a generalised conversational implicature theory.   Thus I only discuss the GCI view henceforth. 41
	 The features of  conversational implicature most relevant here are: they are non-detachable; 
they are cancellable in both embedded and non-embedded uses; they can project. 
	 I suggested above that attitude expression projects; the attitude of  caring about morality is 
conveyed not only by D1 but also by D2-5. We saw that a conventional implicature view would explain 
this given that conventional implicatures project. However, although projection of  conversational 
implicatures is more complicated and non-constant, it can occur.   For example, take the GCI 42
carried by utterances using ‘partner’ thus: 
!
	 GCI3: ‘John’s partner is meeting us here.’ 
!
This implicature is present in the following embedded utterances: 
!
	 GCI4: ‘If  John’s partner comes along then there’ll be ten of  us.’ 
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#  Plausibly this is a difference in degree rather than kind.39
#  As suggested above, the default presumption when someone makes a moral utterance is that they care 40
about morality.
#  Strandberg (2011).41
#  The projection behaviour of  conversational implicatures is, however, messy and complicated. For 42
discussion see Green (1998), Kadmon (2001), Levinson (1983: ch. 3), Recanati (2003).
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	 GCI5: ‘Is John’s partner here?’ 
!
Each of  GCI3-5 carries the implicature that John’s signiﬁcant other is male. Thus the implicature 
carried by ‘partner’ projects.       43 44
	 Whilst the projection of  conversational implicatures is less common than for conventional 
implicatures, it is enough here to note that generalised conversational implicatures can project. Thus 
the fact that attitude expression by moral terms projects is consistent with a conversational 
implicature model. 
	 Conversational implicatures are also non-detachable. Conversational implicatures are non-
detachable because they arise from what is said, in context, not from any particular way of  saying it 
(such as the choice of  one word over another). Any way of  saying the gold is in the bank vault or in the 
desert will trigger the implicature that the speaker does not know where the gold is. A conversational 
implicature model can thus accommodate the apparent fact that moral attitude expression is non-
detachable. For attitude expression is not generated by the speaker’s choice of  a particular term over 
another. Any way of  (actually) saying the same thing as D1 will convey that the speaker cares about 
morality. 
	 Conversational implicatures are also cancellable. One can signal that one did not mean to 
convey the otherwise implicated proposition without thereby making one’s utterance linguistically 
improper. For example, the speaker can say:  
!
	 GCI1*. ‘The gold is in the bank vault or in the desert. I won’t tell you which.’  
!
The second sentence cancels, or preempts, the implicature that the speaker does not know where the 
gold is. Conversational implicatures are cancellable in both embedded and non-embedded uses. 
Some other examples are: 
	  
	 GCI2*. ‘John has six children at the very least’.  
	 [Preempted/Cancelled implicature: John has exactly six children.] 
!
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#  Assumption: the context is not one in which people are likely to be referring to business partners (for 43
example). Experience suggests this implicature is region-dependent, weaker than it once was, and, happily, 
weakening over time. However I hope it still occurs in a wide enough range of  contexts to demonstrate the 
point.
#  Should we treat it as a Conventional Implicature? No, the implicature is felicitously cancelled in utterances 44
such as ‘John’s partner, she’s Italian’, ‘If  John’s partner comes along she’ll bring wine for sure’.
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	 GCI8. ‘If  the gold is in the bank vault or the desert, and I’m not telling you if  it’s in 	
either, you should start looking soon.’ 
	 [Preempted/Cancelled implicature: Speaker does not know where the gold is.]  
!
In this way, a GCI model can explain why utterances such as D1*-5* are felicitous though 
surprising. 
	 To sum up, moral attitude expression projects, which a GCI story accommodates. Moral 
attitude expression is also non-detachable and cancellable (though unusual), which ﬁts with a GCI 
view. Generalised conversational implicature is thus a good ﬁt with moral attitude expression and a 
better ﬁt than either conventional implicature, or presupposition. 
	 Whilst the conclusion just given suggests that I am rejecting Copp’s pragmatic view, given its 
billing as a conventional implicature view, let me brieﬂy explain why the distance between Copp and 
conversational implicaturists is less than it initally appears.  
	 Much of  the complication here stem from the details of  Copp’s view. Though he calls it a 
conventional implicature view, two of  its features are unorthodox.   First, at least in earlier work, 45
Copp claims that moral expressions convey attitudes by conventional implicature only when used to 
make ‘basic moral assertions’ where ‘[a] "basic" moral proposition is a proposition that entails, for 
some moral property M, that something instantiates M.’   He holds that non-basic moral 46
propositions, such as conditionals, do not convey desire-like attitudes by conventional implicature 
but by conversational implicature.   By restricting the contexts in which the implicature is triggered, 47
and by using conversational implicature for non-basic assertions, Copp’s view is closer to a GCI 
view than a conventional implicature view. 
	 Second, in earlier work, Copp takes attitude expression to be cancellable, thus deviating from 
a standard understanding of  conventional implicature.   In later works he distinguishes 48
cancellability from what he calls ‘chancellability’. He suggests that with utterances like D1*-5* the 
attitude expression, though not cancellable, is ‘chancellable’ which he glosses as the claim that it would 
not be reasonable to interpret the speaker of  D1*-5* as intending to convey that they care about morality, 
given their denial. Copp however retains the claim that these utterances involve a misuse of  the 
term (so they are infelicitous) and suggests this means that attitude expression is not strictly 
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#  Another feature: Copp (2009) calls his view a conventional Simplicature view. He differentiates them on 45
the grounds that implicatures must be intended by the speaker whereas simplicatures need not. For useful 
discussion of  the issue of  whether implicatures must be intended see Saul (2001, 2002).
#  Copp (2001: 5, n.8).46
#  Copp (2001: 37).47
#  Copp (2001: 36).48
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cancellable. His view is interesting in being a conventional implicature story which initially allowed a 
conventional implicature to be cancelled before evolving into a view combining orthodox non-
cancellability with a new, less demanding, property of  chancellability. One upshot is that, as Copp 
suggests,   the apparent disagreement between him and Finlay may be merely apparent. 49
!
§4. A SIMPLER PRAGMATIC STORY 
Out of  presupposition, conventional implicature, and generalised conversational implicature, the 
latter is the most plausible form for a pragmatic hybrid theory of  moral language to take. One 
question for such a hybrid view though is why sentences like D1 standardly convey that the speaker 
cares about morality. Finlay and Strandberg each provide proposals.   Strandberg’s rests on the 50
following claims: 
!
	 B1. Moral discourse generally has the mutually accepted purpose of  inﬂuencing behaviour. 
	 B2. People who think that some action (type) is wrong generally want such actions not to be 
	 performed.   51
!
Strandberg argues that moral utterances will convey desire-like attitudes via GCI for two reasons. 
First, a speaker who lacks such attitudes would violate the maxim of  relevance. This is because, given 
(B1), ‘she would not have uttered the sentence unless she wants that such actions are not carried 
out’.   Second, we can assume that the connection mentioned in B2 holds, unless the speaker signals 52
otherwise and thus the speaker of  D1 would violate the maxim of  quantity if  they were to report that 
they cared about morality, and so from their not doing so we should infer that they do care about 
morality. 
	 However, one might deliver the same results whilst incurring even fewer commitments with 
an even more minimal non-GCI view (though the difference between the two views would be small). 
I claimed above that moral discourse in everyday contexts has these background assumptions:  
!
(i) that most people care about morality at least somewhat. 
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#  Copp (2009: 196).49
#  Finlay’s (2004) proposal depends on his end-relational analysis of  moral beliefs so is, I presume, a less 50
typical case of  a GCI view than Strandberg’s.
#  Strandberg (2011: 19, 22).51
#  Strandberg (2011: 20).52
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(ii) someone’s engaging in utterances about what is required, permitted, prohibited by some 
standard makes it reasonable to infer that they care about (conformity to) that standard. 
!
One option for a pragmatic hybrid view is to adopt a more minimal type of  pragmatic view where 
moral utterances express desire-like attitudes simply in virtue of  the fact that the default background 
assumption of  moral conversations contains both (i) and (iii): 
!
	  (iii) people’s moral utterances voice their moral judgements accurately, at least for the 	
	 most part. 
!
Call this kind of  view a ‘simple pragmatic story’ (SPS). Such a view has at least three advantages 
over a GCI view.    First, it leaves fewer hostages to fortune in not being committed to a particular 53
pragmatic theory such as implicature (and the Gricean theory Strandberg endorses).  
	 Second, GCI are carried by utterances deploying expression types. Whilst moral terms are 
commonly deployed to make moral utterances there are a large number of  other locutions used to 
make moral utterances in at least some contexts. These include ‘I wouldn’t do that (if  I were you)’, 
‘I’d be disappointed if  you did that!’, ‘how would you feel if  he did that?’, ‘what if  everyone did 
that?’, ‘Would X do that?’. The fact that recognizably moral utterances sometimes do not deploy 
speciﬁcally moral terms is a weakness of  a GCI view given that the view claims that it is the use of  
expression types which triggers the implicature. Whilst one might think that this fact shows merely 
that the GCI view needs a longer list of  GCI triggers than simply the paradigmatic moral terms 
considered so far, the longer this list of  expressions becomes, and the more it includes expressions 
which only sometimes express moral attitudes, the less explanatory the GCI view appears. Dropping 
the commitment to GCI allows for greater ﬂexibility in explaining moral utterances which do not 
deploy typical moral vocabulary. 
	 Third, SPS can use the same resources to explain attitude-expression in conversational and 
non-conversational contexts (where an implicature story will not apply). These latter contexts are 
cases including: eavesdropping on someone thinking aloud about some moral question, reading 
their diary, noticing their facial expression, or any method of  learning their moral views. Here there 
is no conversation so no possibility of  a GCI explanation of  how we learn of  the desire-like attitudes 
of  the speaker. Thus the GCI view offers one explanation which applies to conversations and a 
separate one for these other cases. SPS, by contrast, treats these cases and conversations alike. In all 
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these cases one gets evidence of  someone’s moral views, views typically connected to the attitude of  
caring about morality.   
	 There is, then, the question whether we should go further than a minimal pragmatic story 
and adopt the GCI view. Though this is important and interesting in its own right, and there are of  
course moves which the GCI theorist can make, I will close by explaining why this dispute does not 
matter much to the pragmatic hybrid project.  
	 As I started by pointing out, a common starting point for ‘going hybrid’ is the thought that 
moral discourse combines belief  and desire like aspects, or is both descriptive and expressive. 
Finding a plausible connection between moral judgements and motivation is a major challenge here. 
In Smith’s words, we need ‘to explain how deliberation on the basis of  our values can be practical in 
its issue to just the extent that it is.  ’ My focus here has been pragmatic approaches to the claim that 54
moral utterances express desire like attitudes. The views left standing - GCI and a more minimal 
pragmatic stories such as SPS - will likely rely on there being a general defeasible connection 
between moral judgement and motivation. The views differ only with respect to moral utterances. This 
difference, though interesting, does not affect the story they give about moral judgements and 
motivation. Whilst there is interesting work to do on determining which is the best model for a 
pragmatic hybrid view, each has available to it the same resources to explain the link between moral 
judgements and motivation, such as there is.   55
!
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